This paper develops an empirically-relevant framework (a) to examine whether or not the African business environment hinders or promotes the knowledge economy (KE), (b) to determine how the KE which emerges from such an environment affects economic growth, and (c) how growth in turn relates to the 'inclusive development' of 53 African countries during the 1996-2010 time period. The framework provides a modest guide to policymaking about, and further research into, such relationships. We implement the framework by building a three-stage model and rationalizing it as five interrelated hypotheses. To allow greater concentration on the issues that are themselves already complex, our model is very simple, but clear. For example, we make neither an attempt to evaluate causality nor to test for it, even though we suspect the links to be multi-directional -opportunity costs are everywhere. Instead we focus on fundamental relationships between the dynamics of starting business and doing business as expressed in the state of KE, and through it to the inclusive development via the economic growth of those countries. Estimation results indicate that the dynamics of starting and doing business explain strongly a large part of variations in KE. The link between KE and economic growth exists, but it is weak, and we provide plausible reasons for such a result. Despite the weak association between KE and economic growth, KE-influenced growth plays a very important role in inclusive development. In fact, growth of this kind has stronger effects on inclusive development and by implication on poverty reduction, than some of conventional controls in this study such as FDI, foreign aid, and even private investment. There is clearly room for further research to improve the results, but just as clearly practical policy is best served by not neglecting the relationships examined in this paper.
Introduction
The objective of this paper is three-fold: (a) to examine whether or not the African business environment hinders or promotes the knowledge economy (KE), (b) to determine how the KE which emerges from such an environment affects economic growth, and (c) how growth in turn relates to the 'inclusive development' of 53 African countries during the 1996-2010 time period.
By the national business environment we mean conditions surrounding starting business and doing business. More specifically, we refer to such conditions as business dynamics, and they include: (a) dynamics of starting business, and (b) dynamics of doing (operating) business. Even though we will be talking only of "doing business", technically the dynamics of doing business include (i) trade, (ii) technology exports and/or imports, (iii) property rights and, (iv) closing business 1 .
The examination is important for a number of reasons including the following four. First, at the microeconomic level business dynamics influence the value of the firm, and in a world increasingly driven by technologies of all sort, the value of the firm affects the long-term development, sustainability, and performance of the KE (Ernst & Young, 2013; Leke et al., 2010; Anyanwu et al., 2012; Kuada, 2009) . This first contribution is in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2013, pp. 7-13) .
Second, the performance of KE ultimately affects the competitiveness of nations, which in turn has measurable implications for economic growth and inclusive development. We deliberately utilize the notion of inclusive development to suggest that our analysis goes beyond assessing the growth-development nexus of the conventional variety to inclusive development, because 'output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer' (Lewis, 1955, emphasis added) . This Lewisian thesis has been recently rediscovered by Piketty's (2014) 'Capital in the 21 st Century' in developed countries along with a growing stream of literature on developing nations (Kalwij & Verschoor, 2007; Thorbecke, 2013; Fosu, 2009 Fosu, , 2014 Singh, 2014) .
1 These business dynamics are not affected by multicollinearity and overparameterization issues. Hence, unlike the KE indicators, there is no need to construct indices in order to avoid redundancy of information. The correlation analysis can be provided upon request. Moreover, Tchamyou (2014a) and Tchamyou (2014b) have used them distinctly as dependent and independent variables respectively.
Third, there is continued effort aimed at enhancing understanding of the factors and forces determining the KE in African countries to which this paper seeks to contribute. The contribution extends recent African literature on institutional determinants of innovation (Oluwatobi et al., 2014) , business research (Sigue, 2011) , and entrepreneurship (Brixiova et al., 2015) needed for the continent to emerge from poverty (Kuada, 2011) . Studies closest to the current exposition in the literature include Tchamyou (2014ab) . Tchamyou (2014a) has investigated the role of KE in African business while Tchamyou (2014b) has assessed the reverse relationship, i.e., the impact of entrepreneurship on KE in Africa. The latter study informs the first-stage of empirical analysis of the current study. We build on it by incorporating economic growth in the second stage, and inclusive human development in the third stage. While business dynamics might obviously influence KE, we go two steps further in investigating how the nexuses are growth-enhancing on the one hand, and on the other hand, how 'the positive externalities of the growth-enhancing KE from business dynamics' might seep through onto inclusive development.
Finally, and as far as we know, extant theoretical and empirical work ignores, and/or pays insufficient attention to, the essential links between African business dynamics, KE, economic growth, and inclusive development.
We approach the issues in a stylized three-stage fashion (model) in which business dynamics affect KE, KE affects economic growth, and growth affects inclusive development. The model is estimated and tested as five interrelated hypotheses. In doing so we find that starting and doing business do indeed explain a large part of variations in KE observed in African countries, and that KE has affected growth, and through growth inclusive development. The magnitudes of the effects are low at all three stages, but they are reasonably signed and statistically and/or economically significant. We conclude that the three stages are critical to the future progress of African countries, and call policy and further research attention to them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, and is followed by the methodology in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while Section 5 discusses the concluding economic implications of results for policy and further research.
Literature
This section is divided into four sub-sections, each with a specific theme that forms the basis for the structure of the hypotheses and the estimation technique deployed in subsequent parts of the paper. While stylized, the approach is simple, clear, and easy both to implement and follow.
Business Dynamics and Business Performance
The general literature on the effects of the business environment (climate) on the performance of firms is huge and very old. Michael E. Porter (1990 Porter ( , 1998 traces the literature back to Adam
Smith's concepts of division of labor, comparative advantage, and specialization across economies as illustrated by the example of the safety pin factory (Smith, 1937 (Smith, [1776 , cf. Stigler, 1957) . 2 Influenced by Smith regional economists (like Krugman) and other regional scientists (mainly economic geographers) have long insisted that the optimal location of an economic activity is a function of the basic business costs as well as location-specific costs (Richardson, 1969) . The determinants of such costs (and benefits) include the availability of primary factors of production (land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship), availability of, and accessibility to, local and global product and money markets, availability of good transport and physical infrastructure systems, and opportunities for agglomeration and other external economies made possible by the availability of amenities like libraries, schools/colleges/universities, social networks, and so on. Porter (1998) has depicted all these in a simple but clarifying diagram with four interactive vortexes, representing the "firm strategy, structure, and rivalry" in one vortex, "related and supporting industries" in the second vortex, the "factor conditions" (supply) in the third vortex, and in the fourth vortex "demand conditions" -all subject to random chance and non-random government policy (see Porter's Figure 1, 1990 , p. 127, or 1998 (Gutierrez, Lee and Virto, 2009; Gille, Noumba Um, Rudel, and Simon, 2002; Esselaar, Gilwald, and Stork, 2007; Gilwald and Stork, 2008) . All these cannot be explained by a negative business climate, perhaps not even by a positive one alone.
From Business Dynamics to KE
A KE is a shortcut for a knowledge-based economy. According to the WB a KE has four pillars, and their corresponding indicators. Therefore any business environment that affects the creation, transfer, and spread of knowledge essentially affects the very foundation of the KE. Changes in any of the four pillars, or indicators, of the KE are changes in the KE itself, with all potential to lower, or raise countries' performance and ranking on the knowledge economy index (KEI).
Again as indicated in the introduction above, we are unaware of any study that specifically links business dynamics, or their indicators, to the KE. This study attempts to fill that gap in understanding. Amavilah, Asongu, and Andres (2014) extended the previous study, by considering the effects on KE of globalization-related peace and stability acting through governance. It turned out that governance affects KE differently depending on the kind of globalization, the peace and stability it induces, and the type of governance through which it influences the KE. In general the peace and stability induced by trade-related globalization have stronger effects on governance, and hence on KE, than peace and stability resulting from FDI-related stability associated with globalization represented as financial flows.
From KE to Economic Growth
The importance of the relationship between the KE and the general economy depends on the intensity of the knowledge underlying the KE itself. At the early stages of progress KE acts like technology and each general economy has some KE just as it has some knowledge. Think of an x-dimensional plane with a tiny dot in it. As the economy grows, the dot (KE) also gets bigger and bigger. How big KE is at any point in time depends on the relative difference between the rates of growth of the KE and the general economy. If KE grows faster than the general economy, then KE essentially becomes a factor of production that encompasses human capital itself. In highly knowledge-intensive economies, KE and the general economy are the same things. Thus, the special nature of the KE is that it can be both an input and an output. Now, KE viewed as technology, changes in it would lead to changes in both production and consumption possibilities, depending on whether they affect the demand or supply side.
Economists would recognize that sustained expansion of production possibilities is economic growth, and improvement in consumption possibilities is a sign of economic well-being, which when sustained makes for inclusive development. We return to the preceding statement in the next sub-section, and later.
If KE is taken to be a factor of production, that is an index of a kind of aggregate human capital, then it would have institutional effects on other factors of production as well as on national innovation systems. This is the perspective implicit in Andres, study on the impact of formal institutions on KE, which was recently extended by Amavilah, Asongu, and Andres's (2014) examination of the effects of globalization-induced peace and stability on KE via governance. The literature which guided both papers above is relevant to this one as well, and we strongly encourage the interested reader to go to that literature for further elucidation. Suffice to say that the literature illustrates clearly the importance of the links between the KE and the growth of the general economy. What we do in this paper is quantify that link in a way that acknowledges the surrounding business context -and that, as far as we know, has never been done for developing countries, and most certainly not for African countries.
From Economic Growth to Economic Development
Economic growth improves production possibilities, but possibilities do not always mean equal benefits. A number of UN reports are full of recent examples of growth that is accompanied by inequality, poverty, or both. Indeed, inspired by Kuznets's (1955 Kuznets's ( , 1971 Kjoller-Hansen and Sperling (2013) quantify inclusive growth "by setting up five distinct criteria for inclusive growth in relation to productive employment", and they used household data to evaluate the experiences of Albenia, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Romania, and Tajikistan. They found that countries' experiences differed given their "timespan, history, income level, culture, political structure, religious orientation, etc." (p. 10). For example, "more diversified economies at a higher income level seem to perform better against the five criteria of inclusive growth" (p. 15) -suggesting further that "… growth in GDP per capita is not enough for development to be inclusive, [and that] more moderate growth rates, coupled with structural changes, can be as inclusive as high growth rates without" (p. 15). This is consistent with our statements above.
Finally, Ianchovichina and Lundstrom's (2009) framework and its application to Zambia are both very well done and we rely on their paper to benchmark ours. Clearly growth is meaningful only if it reduces poverty and inequality, and if it does so in a sustained and sustainable manner.
To be sustainable it has to be "broad-based." To be sustained inclusive growth needs a viable technology and be able to remove micro-and macro-economic constraints imposed by business dynamics, and the conventional factors and forces of production. In the case of Zambia the constraints included: (a) the employability of the poor themselves, (b) the cost of physical capital, (c) low social returns to natural resource endowments, (d) geography, (e) infrastructure, (f) human capital, (g) government failures with respect to the macroeconomic environment and taxation, (h) governance, and (i) pure market failures due to public goods/services, common resources, externalities, and/or asymmetric information costs (uncertainty and risks).
Both Ianchovichina and Lundstrom, and Kjoller-Hansen and Spirling provide practical formulas for characterizing income from employment of resources which individual persons or countries need to meet the requirement, the Euler or Keynes-Ramsey, conditions for inclusiveness which captures the welfare effects of inclusive growth.
We use innovate around the Ianchovichina and Lundstrom (2009) insight to argue that since sustainable growth is sustained inclusive growth, it is a good enough proxy for inclusive development. This means that we take Sen's (1983 Sen's ( , 1999 definition of development as the capability that allows for freedom. In other words, the object of such development is national well-being. Thus, the human development index (HDI) is a better measure of well-being (standard of living) than per capita GDP (Sen, 1997, Anand and Sen, 1994) . In addition, instead of focusing on the HDI, we rely on the inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI).
As described in various Human Development Reports (HDRs) the IHDI accounts for HDI Less the "loss of human development due to inequality." The larger the distance between the HDI and the IHDI, the greater inequality, and the coefficient of human development inequality measure the intensity of such inequality, i.e., or the "loss in HDI due to inequality" (HDR, 2014, p. 4 understand that using IHDI is admission on our part that any statement we ultimately make about poverty reduction or increase is an inference from the assumption that inequality and poverty are positively correlated.
Methodology
Our methodology has a number of stylized components. First, we describe the theoretical model we assume. Second, we construct testable hypotheses that would allow us to implement our model. Third, we outline key variables of interest, and corresponding data and data sources, and subject the data to the principal component analysis to deal with the usual statistical problems.
Finally, we characterize our estimation technique and put it to work.
Model
At the empirical level we solve the problem in parts for reasons discussed later. This section summarizes the relationships described above concisely. We begin the description with an assumption that all SSACs in our sample have two coexisting theoretical economies: the KE, , and the general economy, (cf. Lucas and Moll, 2013) . depends on micro-and macroeconomic determinants among them our business dynamics which we designate as as well as controls ( ), where all countries are identified and the variables are time-indexed, but for simplicity country and time subscripts are ignored. Then Normalizing (1) by dividing through with some specific we get where the lowercase letters are logarithmic data and uppercase are raw data.
If we suppose that the link between ( ) and the general economy ( ) is either very weak or non-existent, so that the latter depends only on its own factors ( ) and forces ( ), then it would be determined as However, we know that every economy has its own ( ), that the difference across economies is of the size and sophistication of (Y 1 , y 1 ), not its existence. Hence, ( ) affects ( ) either as a productivity shifter (technological constant) acting through , or as a factor of production and in that case it is an element of . There is a lot and interesting things that can be done and said here, but for simplicity we let , such that To be able to associate with growth, we divide (3) by either population to get per capita income (real GDP) or by labor to obtain per labor (worker) income (output). After taking the natural logs, (3) becomes, which represents the growth equation and its Euler or Keynes-Ramsey conditions discussed in the papers we cite in the preceding section.
Eqs. (3) and (4) put us right in the middle of the neoclassical growth debate, whether in its Solow (1956, 1957) and Swan (1956 Swan ( , 2002 exogenous version, or its new endogenous version according to Lucas (1988 Lucas ( , 1993 , Rome (1990) , Aghion and Howitt (1992) , Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) , Barro (1991) , and many others. We welcome the debate, but resist the itch and temptation to pursue that route for now. Instead, we restate that the principal goal of all economic activities is to enhance human development in a sustainable way. We then accept Sen's modified capabilities model that inequality, by implication poverty, adjusted human development index (IHDI) is a reasonable measure of the welfare effect of growth, that is, the national well-being or national standard of living. For this reason, let , and note that as described and calculated in the Human Development Reports, is determined by the (a) longevity and health of the population, measured by life-expectancy at birth, (b) the knowledge available to the economy, measured by education and training, and (c) a "decent standard of living", represented by per capita income. All three dimensions are adjusted by their respective inequalities.
Put in a language familiar to growth economists, we designate the sum of the inequality adjusted longevity and health, and knowledge as human capital, H, i.e., Then 
Testable Hypotheses
We claim that in the first stage the dynamics of starting and doing business affect KE in African countries. In the second stage we propose that as determined by business dynamics, KE is important to economic growth in African countries. In other words, (i) growth from starting business is related KE, and (ii) growth from doing business related KE. The third-stage of the estimation process is the most critical one and it deals with the effect on inclusive development of growth-ehancing KE from business dynamics. 5 Consequently, the entire estimation process reduces to the following fiver testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Education (Edutex) from starting and doing business is associated with growth which influences the quality of development (IHDI).
Hypothesis 2:
ICT from starting and doing business is associated with growth which influences the quality of inclusive development (IHDI).
Hypothesis 3: Innovation (Innovx = STJA) from starting and doing business is associated with growth which influences the quality of development (IHDI). UNDP, HDR Technical Notes, 2014; Majerova, 2012) , and adjusted the whole series. 5 We use the "quality of development" and "inclusive development" interchangeably.
with growth which influences the quality of development (IHDI).
Hypothesis 5: Institutional regime (Instireg) from starting and doing business is associated with growth which influences the quality of development (IHDI).
Variables and Data and Principal Component (PCA)
In this part of the methodology we describe briefly key variables, their corresponding data and data sources. As often is the case in developing countries, available data is both limited and inaccurate. However, instead of filling in existing gaps with data from different sources, we chose to use World Bank (WDI) data primarily. Such a choice comes with a trade-off between consistency and small-size sample. 
Variables and Data

KE Indicators and Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Even without formal diagnostics, it is clear from Table 1 that there are bound to be significant correlations among the indicators of KE, and between KE indications and business dynamics. Since Jolliffe's (1986) seminal work, research has shown that the PCA can be utilized to reduce highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated indicators called principal components (PCs) that retain a substantial portion of information in the initial dataset, see, e.g., Kaiser (1974; Fomby, Hill, and Johnson, 1984; Jolliffe, 2002) . The research recommends the retention of PCs with an eigenvalue that is greater than the mean, or greater than one. In the present case eigenvalues range from 1.31 for the Economic Incentive (Creditex) variable to as high as 4.64 for the Institutional Regime (Instireg) variable. We use logSTJA to proxy for Innovation (Innovex = logSTJA) because of limited degrees of freedom in the other components. Again, the importance of eigenvalues is that they denote eigenvectors that have a significant proportion of the initial information or total variability. As Table 3 and Instireg correspond consistently to eigenvalues that are greater than one -meaning the vectors retain between 66% and 77% of overall information. 
Estimation Technique
We estimate the model in three stages we describe next below. • (Y 2 , y 2 )
• Controls = (X 3 , x 3 ) • Other Considerations priori, but assumed to be random. Thus, in (6) as opposed to the alternatives.
Results
Tables 4-8 present estimation results by stage, and it is to those we turn next. 
First-stage KE-Business dynamics Nexus
Second-stage Growth-KE Nexus
Third-stage: Development-Growth Nexus --Panel Fixed Effects regression
The results from the third-stage estimation are in Table 8 . In Panel B of Table 8 the effects on inclusive development of growth associated with KE from doing business without and with time effects are less impressive, and in fact negative for ICT without and with time effects, negative for Creditex and Innovex = STJA, and average KE with time effects. Excluding time effects, growth that is influenced by KE from doing business explains 26% -96%. In summary, without the time effects a one percent increase in growth enhanced by KE from starting business improves inclusive development by 1.3%, and only by half a percent when the time effects are included. Inclusive development increases by 1.1% for every one percent increase in growth related to KE from doing business.
The key control variables have the expected signs. Asongu (2013a) has established that in the African literature on inclusive growth, low and stable inflation is pro-poor. His results are consistent with the findings of Albanesi (2007) on the disequalizing income-distribution effect of high inflation on the one hand and the results of Bulir (1998) and Lopez (2004) on the equalizing income distribution effect of low inflation, on the other hand 10 . The negative effect of foreign direct investment on inclusive development is consistent with a recent study on quality of growth in developing countries (Mlachila et al., 2014) or IHDI in African countries (Asongu, 2014a) .
The positive effect of investment (public and private) on IHDI is consistent with intuition and the predictions of economic theory. Interestingly, moreover, also public investment appear to exert a stronger effect on inclusive development than private investment. 
Concluding Implications
The main purpose of this paper is study the relationships (a) between the business environment and KE, (b) between KE so determined and economic growth, and consequently (c) between economic growth and inclusive development in a number of African countries. We represent the business environment with the dynamics of starting and doing business in those countries.
Economic growth is measured conventionally as the growth rate of real GDP and inclusive development is inequality-adjusted HDI. As indicated by the adjusted R-squares and exact F statistic, the explanatory power of the regression of KE on starting and doing business dynamics is reasonable, i.e., the effects of business dynamics on KE are both nonzero and strong. Thus, contrary to popular pronouncements, the African business environment may not be perfect for the rapid development of KE, but the results reveal that the dynamics of starting and doing business in these countries are certainly not hostile to KE.
At the second stage of the estimation, the results indicate a weak link between the KE as determined in the first stage and economic growth. Both adjusted R-squares and F-statistic are low. One reasonable explanation is that the weakness could be due to the synergic effect from combined dimensions of KE enhancing growth. It should be noted that, relative to individual KE components, the growth-enhancing effect from KE is quite substantial. This is not new conjecture, because the KE literature demonstrates convincingly that, South Korea's growthenhancing benefits from KE have been based on a strategy that incorporates all the dimensions of KE (Suh & Chen, 2007; Lee, 2009) . Another plausible explanation is that the low adjusted Rsquares simply indicate missing relevant variables, which is not unreasonable given the large constant terms. Such an explanation is also likely because parameter signs are generally consistent with economic tuition and intuition. For instance, if KE is taken to be a technology, then its weak effect on growth is consistent with the so-called "Africa dummy" found to be either low or negative in growth regressions (cf. Temple, 1999; Temple & Johnson, 1998) . If KE is an output, the results reflect the fact that in this group of countries KE is a tiny fraction of the general economy. Hence, whereas the econometrician purist would be troubled by the low level of statistical significance, we insist that the results are indicative of economic significance and relevance of the situation, and recommend further research. Such research could focus on the possibility of specification bias (wrong functional forms), miss-specification (wrong variables included or correct variables excluded), or on the estimation techniques. One possible suspect of miss-specification in this respect is the dynamics of closing business, which we excluded from the regressions due to inadequate data. But even without that effort, it is the case that low adjusted R-squares and F-statistic are not zero, and hence the coefficients of included variables are not simultaneously equal zero.
Regarding the third-stage estimation results, the hypotheses we set out to investigate have been overwhelmingly validated. For example: Education from starting and doing business is associated with growth, which in turn influences the quality of development (Hypothesis 1);
ICT from starting and doing business is associated with growth which influences the quality of development (Hypothesis 2); Innovation from starting and doing business is associated with growth which influences the quality of development (Hypothesis 3); Economic incentives from starting and doing business is associated with growth which influences the quality of development (Hypothesis 4); and Institutional regime from starting and doing business is associated with growth which influences the quality of development (Hypothesis 5). Obviously not all associations are statistically significant, but that does not bother us greatly, because, given the small number of observations we had to work with, we are comfortable taking a minimalistic approach by not placing too much emphasis on the magnitude of estimated coefficients, relative to their signs. We understand that the low magnitude of parameter is due to the varying degrees of adjusted (linearized) coefficients of determinants across various stages of the empirical analysis. Econometrically speaking, linearity in the parameters is not the same thing as linearity in the variables. Even so, a key policy conclusion one can draw from the results so far is that they dispute categorical statements that the African business environment is bad for inclusive development, worse for economic growth, and crippling (worst) for KE. In what follows below we stress the results in detail in respect of specific hypotheses.
First, we have found that the African business environment influences the quality of education which logically has growth enhancing benefits that ultimately improve inclusive human development. This finding is consistent with the African entrepreneurship literature as it relates to general education. Greater business exposure -including exposure to entrepreneurial studies -boosts students' entrepreneurial acumen, sharpness, propensity, and even youth entrepreneurship, resulting in needed financial literacy (Singh, et. al., 2011; Gerba, 2012; Oseifuah, 2010; Ita et al., 2014) . From that viewpoint inclusive human development is in line with Mensah & Benedict's (2010) study on the positive impact of starting and doing business on poverty reduction. Two other related perspectives hold that the production value of knowledge (education), and positive human capital externalities from learning in the African continent, which are increasingly and strongly influenced by the positive business environment, also have growth-enhancing effects on inclusive human development (Amavilah, 2009; Wantchekon, et. al., 2014) .
The following policy implications are relevant to boosting the education dimension of KE: for a previously marginalized portion of the population (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Asongu, 2015) .
As a policy implication, substantial investment in ICT infrastructure would go a long way toward improving both growth and inclusive development. While business constraints are already pushing most African governments into the direction of adopting such an initiative, pro-poor growth investment priorities in the implementation would still be critical to overall policy success. Like Tchamyou (2014a), we recommend that the ICT-friendly measures be implemented in collaboration with other soundly integrated policies that take into account policies such as a policy of industrialization, a regulatory & competitive policy, and a vibrant computing-literacy, and numeracy policy. Since, there is already a growing consensus that liberalization of the ICT sector in Africa has had considerable pro-poor benefits (Asongu, 2015) , the liberalization policy could consolidate the insights from Korea's success story. According to Suh & Chen (2007) , in Korea policies favoring ICTs have been motivated along three main axes:
an industrial policy requiring sound R&D and venture capital; a 'competitive & regulatory'
policy entailing privatization and market liberalization, and an 'active policy of information'
requiring the setting-up of electronic governance mechanisms and building of advanced infrastructure.
Third, the positive effect of business activities on innovation in terms of STJA provides interesting insights on the need to invest more in the production of scientific publications in African countries that is presently lagging behind that of other regions of the world. Chavula Chavula's analysis, we have provided new and clarifying insights into these interrelationships.
STJA could be enhanced through less tight Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) regimes on determinants of scientific publications like software (Asongu, 2014b) that have been established to be pro-poor in Africa (Asongu, 2014c) .
As a policy implication, bold initiatives are essential to boosting science & technology in institutions of higher learning. This would require among others, an innovation policy that is consistent with Africa's level of development, and in this sense policies favouring reverse engineering may be worthwhile, because the technology in the sampled countries is more imitative and adaptive than anything else. This line of policy recommendation is in accordance with the underlying factors of the East Asian Miracle . However, it is still worth noting that, following Romer (1993) and Lewis (1955) , Amavilah (2005) has added that the technology that matters to long-run economic growth is not only a function of resources alone; it is also determined by the interactions and intra-actions among resources. For example, huge investments in educational (school) and/or research structures, physical or virtual, along with mediocre investments in teachers, students, and researchers, are likely less productive than small investments is both "objects" and "ideas", to use Romer's lingo (Amavilah, 2005) . This perspective is consistent with Schultz's (1981) call for 'investment in people', and Lucas's (1993) conclusion that the Asian growth miracle was really just a man-made miracle. This is similar to Lewis (1955 Lewis ( [1965 Fourth, it is natural to expect an improving business environment (like the one currently unfolding in Africa) to stimulate economic incentives by means of credit facilities which ultimately engender growth and inclusive human development. However, documented surplus liquidity issues severely constrain financial allocation efficiency in Africa, and the resulting inefficiency is not a good channel to inequality mitigation (Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2013a) . As a policy implication, capital requirements in Small & Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) should be adequately addressed, because, relative to multinational companies (MNCs), pro-poor externalities from SMEs are likely larger than those from MNCs.
Fifth, the finding related to the hypothesis on the institutional regime pillar of KE clearly articulates the imperative of good institutions in growth, which extends to inclusive development. This also supports a clarification by Amavilah et al. (2014) of Andrés et al. (2014) on the positive role of institutions in KE-related development when more factors are taken into account. Among other studies on institutions, Oluwatobi et al. (2014) have recently established that government effectiveness and regulation quality are the most relevant for growth enhancing innovations. Again, this is in line with the critical dimension of institutions for the emergence of Africa stressed in Fosu (2013ab) and Musila & Sigue ( 2010 , and inclusive development discussed by Mlachila et al. (2014) . Improvement of the institutional regime component should be in conjunction with other economic policies already discussed.
Sixth, we will be remiss if we did not point out that incidental to the main purpose of this study, the results also reveal other interesting insights as well as important implications associated with the control and other variables of the study. Among these foreign aid (proxied by NODA) is inversely related to inclusive development. Such a result is familiar to the aid-growth debate and we stay away from that debate in this paper, except mention that foreign aid to many African countries has often been crisis-driven as the current effort on Ebola in three West African countries demonstrates. More the most part, such aid has been helpful only insofar as it might keep the recent alive, but less effective in promoting growth, least reducing poverty -obviously a normative statement on our part.
In addition to foreign aid, and inflation discussed already, the net effects on inclusive development of investment are positive. However, it turns out private investment is generally less effective as a means of promoting inclusive development than public investment. In fact, while the effects of public investment on inclusive development are positive, those of private investment are negative, especially with respect to ICT, STJA, Creditex and Instireg. It would seem reasonable to conclude that public policy in these African countries overstresses foreign aid and FDI even though greater benefits lie in supporting the local business environment. Having said a mouthful, we pause to admit that this paper does not offer definitive answers, but it does indeed provide enough fodder for further research, and a firm foundation for improving policymaking in this group of countries. How demonstrable this analysis to policy in other countries represents future research opportunities.
